Volume 67

Issue 2

Article 3

6-22-2022

Delayed & Denied: Recalibrating the ERISA Attorney's Fee Factors
For Healthcare Claims
Katherine T. Vukadin

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, Insurance Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law
Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons

Recommended Citation
Katherine T. Vukadin, Delayed & Denied: Recalibrating the ERISA Attorney's Fee Factors For Healthcare
Claims, 67 Vill. L. Rev. 339 (2022).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol67/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Villanova University Charles Widger
School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor
of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Vukadin: Delayed & Denied: Recalibrating the ERISA Attorney's Fee Factors

2022]
DELAYED & DENIED: RECALIBRATING THE ERISA ATTORNEY’S
FEE FACTORS FOR HEALTHCARE CLAIMS
KATHERINE T. VUKADIN*
ABSTRACT
Millions of Americans count on employer-sponsored health insurance. Recent lawsuits and investigations show, however, that valid claims
are often denied. The governing law, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), shields plan administrators from their mistakes; if a claim is denied without a valid reason, a consumer may sue for
the benefit that should have been paid, but not consequential or punitive
damages.
One aspect of ERISA potentially incentivizes plan administrators to
process claims correctly the first time: an attorney’s fee provision gives
judges discretion to award fees to either side; courts have developed a fivefactor test to guide their discretion. But individual healthcare claimants
can rarely satisfy two of the test’s five factors, thus eroding their chances of
recovering fees and blunting any incentive for administrators to decide
claims correctly the first time. The attorney’s fee test arose in the 1970s in
common fund and pension malfeasance claims; it is an awkward fit for
today’s healthcare claims. The Supreme Court observed in 2010 that the
factors bear “no obvious relation” to ERISA or existing fee-shifting jurisprudence, holding that courts need not use them at all. Yet courts still do.
This Article proposes that courts recalibrate the attorney’s fee factors
for individual healthcare claims. The current factors impose duties and
considerations found nowhere in ERISA, and many prevailing ERISA
plaintiffs cannot recover their attorney’s fees under this standard. A revised five-factor test would help ensure that the fee provision functions as
intended and serves ERISA’s dual goals of protecting benefits and providing ready access to the federal courts.
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INTRODUCTION

A

boy, Nate, has mental health and substance use disorders; he is suicidal, and his long-time therapist concludes that outpatient therapy is
no longer sufficient.1 Nate is a beneficiary on his mother’s employersponsored health benefit plan, which covers mental health treatments, including residential treatment.2 When Nate is admitted to residential treatment in 2016, however, his plan covers some care but then denies most of
it.3 His mother appeals the denial through multiple levels of review, collecting supporting documents and notes from physicians setting out the
need for care.4 The insurer responds with flat denials, ignoring the medical evidence Nate’s mother provided.5
Four years after the first denial, a federal court finds that the insurer
failed to follow the claims regulations, denied the claims without any basis,
and made no factual findings to support the denials.6 The denials contained only conclusory statements, “lack[ing] any analysis, let alone a reasoned analysis.”7 The court orders the administrator to go back and
review the evidence as the law requires and state reasons for its decisions.8
For her four years of claim appeals and litigation, the mother receives no
compensation or attorney’s fee.9 For its repeated denials devoid of facts
or reasoning, the administrator suffers no consequence, except the court’s
order to take the steps it should have taken in the first place.10 Thus,
apart from reputational concerns, the insurer has little reason to follow
the law.
Over 150 million other Americans, like Nate and his mother, rely on
employer-sponsored healthcare benefits.11 Of the approximately 1.4 billion claims filed per year, 100 million—or one out of every fourteen—is
initially denied.12 Some denials are appropriate, such as when the plan
does not cover the person or when the benefit is expressly excluded. In
1. Kerry W. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 444 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1309
(D. Utah 2020) (explaining the factual scenario before the plan denied Nate’s
benefits).
2. Id. at 1307–08.
3. Id. at 1309.
4. Id. at 1309–10.
5. Id. at 1313.
6. Id.
7. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McMillan v. AT&T Umbrella Benefit Plan No. 1, 746 F. App’x 697, 706 (10th Cir. 2018)).
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See Kaiser Family Found., Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population,
KFF, http://www.kff.org/state-indicator/total-population [https://perma.cc/
T3DN-724T] (last visited Apr. 2, 2021).
12. Karen Pollitz & Daniel McDermott, Claims Denials and Appeals in ACA Marketplace Plans, KFF (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.kff.org/private-insurance/issuebrief/claims-denials-and-appeals-in-aca-marketplace-plans/.
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other cases, however, promised benefits are improperly denied, sometimes
by mistake but other times on a systematic basis.13 Consumers appeal only
about one in every 10,000 claims,14 so improper denials result in gains for
the payor most of the time.
Administrators have little to lose by denying a covered claim. Consumers can sue for their benefits under the governing Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),15 but the remedies are
sparse—no consequential or punitive damages are allowed, no matter how
long consumers pursue covered care and no matter what they suffer from
its absence.16 Failure to follow claims regulations generally results in no
remedy at all.17 Courts use a deferential standard to review claims decisions, so denials stand if they have any support in the record.18
In one bright spot for consumers, an attorney’s fees provision gives
judges discretion to award fees to either side, in keeping with ERISA’s goal
of providing “ready access to the Federal courts.”19 To guide this discretion, courts in the 1970s crafted a test calling for the analysis of five factors.20 Courts continue to apply the five factors test today. Courts ask
whether the fee defendant acted in bad faith or culpably, whether the fee
13. See infra Part I.
14. See id.
15. “[T]he continued well-being and security of millions of employees and
their dependents are directly affected by” employer-sponsored benefits. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a) (2022). ERISA is intended to “protect . . . participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . . by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing
for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.” Id.
§ 1001(b).
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (allowing a participant or beneficiary to bring a
civil action “(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this
subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable
relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan”); see also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (allowing no remedy for delay in claims processing); id. (allowing no consequential damages); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d
1321, 1338 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting ERISA’s lack of remedies for even serious
claims processing mistakes).
17. See, e.g., Lafleur v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 563 F.3d 148, 157 (5th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Wade v. Hewlett-Packard Dev. Co. LP Short Term Disability
Plan, 493 F.3d 533, 537 (5th Cir. 2007)) (“[F]ailure to fulfill procedural requirements generally does not give rise to a substantive damage remedy.”); Abatie v.
Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 971 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that failure
to follow claims regulations leads to no substantive remedy); Duncan v. Assisted
Living Concepts, Inc., No. 03-1931, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1975, at *10 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 10, 2005) (noting that there is no substantive remedy for procedural violations). But see Bard v. Bos. Shipping Ass’n, 471 F.3d 229, 244–46 (1st Cir. 2006)
(striking defendant’s evidence and awarding benefits where procedural violations
were “serious, had a connection to the substantive decision reached, and call[ed]
into question the integrity of the benefits-denial decision itself”).
18. See infra Part IV.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
20. See Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 464–65 (10th Cir. 1978).
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defendant can satisfy a fee award, what the deterrent effect would be on
other similar actors, whether the fee claimant sought to or did benefit all
plan members or resolved a complex legal issue, and what the merits are
of the parties’ positions.21
The early ERISA fee cases involved financial malfeasance and recoveries that accrued to all plan members—these features are reflected in the
attorney’s fee test that grew out of those cases. The test accordingly inquires as to the defendant’s bad faith or culpability; another factor rewards claimants who seek to benefit all plan members or who resolve a
complex legal issue.22 These two factors worked well for that original context but have become a barrier to attorney’s fee awards in healthcare claim
cases.
The bad faith or culpability factor is applied inconsistently in healthcare cases, with some courts requiring actual dishonesty before the factor
can be satisfied. Plaintiffs struggle to show a defendant’s dishonest mental
state because discovery is generally prohibited in ERISA cases, particularly
into the defendant’s motivations.23 Besides, defendants who improperly
deny claims often are not dishonest per se—they just don’t pay covered
claims. Their tactics may include ignoring evidence that supports the
claim, using internal guidelines that are stricter than those in the plan
documents, denying valid claims, forcing the plaintiff to litigate, and using
overly aggressive utilization review.24
As to the factor asking whether the plaintiff intended to or actually
benefitted other plan members or resolved a complex legal issue, this factor made sense in the common fund cases in which it originated.25 In
those cases, courts applied equitable fee-shifting principles and found that
where litigation created a common fund or benefit that accrued to all plan
members, the non-litigating members would be unjustly enriched without
also sharing in the attorney’s fee. There is no common fund and no such
equitable issue, however, when individual plaintiffs simply seek their rightful benefits under ERISA. In these cases, the wrong-doing defendant, not
the plan, generally pays the fees. And, to satisfy this factor as it is commonly interpreted, plaintiffs would have to enlarge their claims (to include other plaintiffs) and theories (to include more complex legal
issues), which cuts against ERISA’s goal of speedy and inexpensive claims
resolution. Thus, in healthcare cases particularly, this factor burdens
plaintiffs’ efforts to recover their benefits and attorney’s fees, thus thwarting ERISA’s goal of safeguarding benefits and providing ready access to
the federal courts.
21. See Hardt v. Reliance Standard Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 249 n.1 (2010).
22. See id.
23. See infra Section IV.A.2.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1304 (6th Cir. 1991)
(“This appears to be a codification of the common fund doctrine of the common
law.”).
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The five-factor test is no longer required; the Supreme Court in 2010
said the factors bear “no obvious relation” to ERISA or fee-shifting jurisprudence and that courts need not use them.26 Yet courts still apply the
five factors to almost every ERISA attorney’s fee decision, including individual healthcare claims, where plaintiffs can almost never satisfy two of
the factors.27
This Article proposes that the five-factor test be recalibrated for today’s healthcare claims, starting with the bad faith or culpability factor and
the factor calling for plaintiffs to benefit other plan members. Courts
should discount or disregard these two factors in healthcare cases or consider them satisfied differently. For the bad faith or culpability factor,
courts should focus on the culpability aspect of this disjunctive test and
consider this factor satisfied when a fee defendant fails to follow its ERISAimposed fiduciary duty of care, ignores evidence supporting the consumer, or refuses to pay a proper claim. The factor asking that individual
plaintiffs also benefit all plan members while seeking their own contracted
benefits should be discounted in the individual healthcare benefits context or fulfilled when a plaintiff holds a plan administrator to account by
navigating the multi-step, uncompensated administrative appeal process
and bringing suit.
The case for recalibrating the attorney’s fee factors is urgent, as today’s healthcare landscape is hostile to consumers. In the 1970s and 80s,
when the five factors took hold, companies paid claims according to physicians’ diagnostic judgment.28 But before long, payors put aggressive costsaving utilization review measures in place.29 ERISA encouraged the rise
of these measures because it shields payors from the consequences of their
mistakes.30 Moreover, since the Supreme Court’s Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Bruch31 case in 1989, claim denials are reversed only if the administrator’s decision is arbitrary or capricious; unless the denial is completely
without evidence or guiding principle, it stays in place.32 For consumers

26. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 254–55 (2010).
27. See infra Part III.
28. See infra Section III.A.
29. See id.
30. JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF
1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 283 (2005) (“ERISA played an important role in the
development of utilization review . . . because the preemption and remedial provisions shield[ ] utilization reviewers from liability for mistakes.”).
31. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
32. Id. at 115. The Firestone case stated that the standard of review in ERISA
cases should be de novo unless the plan administrator and participants agree on a
narrower standard. Id. Following this decision, discretion-granting provisions became ubiquitous in ERISA plans, so that standard is now usually the arbitrary and
capricious standard. Id. This standard “afford[s] less protection to employees and
their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before ERISA was enacted.” Id. at 114.
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with complex cases, particularly mental health claims, this standard has
been devastating.33
Courts, therefore, should accept the Supreme Court’s invitation to
ignore irrelevant attorney’s fee factors and recraft the five-factor ERISA
fees test for healthcare claims. To fulfill ERISA’s promise of protecting
benefits and providing access to the federal courts, plaintiffs need access
to attorney’s fees as ERISA intended, so they can pursue benefit claims.
Part I explains consumers’ lack of remedies when healthcare claims
are improperly delayed or denied. Part II shows how a financial malfeasance case produced today’s five-factor ERISA fees test and explains how
that test applies. Part III shows how today’s climate of cost controls, utilization review, and discretion for plan administrators has tilted the balance, favoring plan administrators over consumers. Part IV explains why
the fees test needs an update: two of the five factors—bad faith or culpability and a claimant’s intent to aid all plan members—miss the point when a
company just refuses to pay an individual’s valid healthcare claim. Part V
shows why ERISA’s fees provision must function unburdened by tangential
considerations, so ERISA can protect benefits as intended.
I.

ERISA AIMS

TO

PROTECT BENEFITS

BUT

VIOLATIONS GO UNPUNISHED

ERISA aims to protect employee benefits, but it lacks incentives for
administrators to process claims correctly the first time—even if an administrator wrongfully withholds benefits for years and forces the consumer to
sue, the administrator usually just ends up being ordered to follow the
rules it should have followed initially.
The consequences of improper claims processing are so slight that
some plan administrators do not even feign concern. Courts have
noted—and criticized—payors’ “cavalier attitude” in the face of ERISA
laws and regulations.34 When one payor was accused of backdating documents so the payor appeared to comply with the regulations, the payor
responded that the payor would not have done so because there was no
incentive for that—lack of compliance has no consequence.35
33. See generally Katherine T. Vukadin, On Opioids & ERISA: The Urgent Case for
a Federal Ban on Discretionary Clauses, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 687 (2019).
34. See, e.g., Finks v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 08-1272, 2009 WL 2230899, at
*4 (D.D.C. July 24, 2009).
35. Id. The payor stated:
There was no incentive to backdate. ERISA caselaw is clear that, at most,
a plan administrator’s failure to meet any regulatory requirement, including appeals deadlines, enables a claimant to proceed directly to court
without waiting for the denial to be issued, and might trigger a de novo
review even when the plan provides deference to the administrator.
Id. The court in that instance took the plan administrator’s attitude as evidence of
bad faith toward the plaintiff in the attorney’s fee analysis. Id.
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Congress enacted ERISA to protect consumers’ employer-sponsored
benefits.36 ERISA focused at first on pension benefits, addressing the
problem of workers unexpectedly losing an anticipated pension due to an
employer’s underfunding or mismanagement.37 In resolving these concerns, ERISA is considered effective.38
ERISA covers welfare benefits such as healthcare plans too,39 but ERISA is less protective of these benefits than the state laws and remedies that
it displaces. That is, ERISA preempts most state laws and claims, including
their punitive damages and other remedies, leaving consumers with little
in their place.40 Insured plans (i.e., those whose claims are paid by an
insurance company rather than by the plan itself) are still subject to state
laws governing insurance.41 But plans that self-fund, or pay their own
claims, are not subject to state insurance laws.42 When ERISA was enacted, most plans did not self-insure—only larger plans tended to do so.43
More plans sought self-funding, however, as state governments passed laws
requiring certain benefits or regulating other aspects of health insurance
plans.44 In addition, stop-loss insurance to guard against unusually large
claims made self-funding more feasible even for smaller plans.45 Now,
most plans are self-funded.46 Because of preemption and the rise of self36. ERISA is intended to “protect . . . participants in employee benefit plans
and their beneficiaries . . . by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and
obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001(b) (2022).
37. See WOOTEN, supra note 30, at 51–52 (explaining that the movement that
led to the passage of ERISA “began in December 1963, when the Studebaker Corporation shut down its auto production plant . . . [and] the pension plan for
hourly workers did not have enough funds to meet its obligations”).
38. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme
Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317,
1322 (2003) (noting that ERISA has largely eliminated the default risk to pension
benefits).
39. ERISA applies “to any employee benefit plan if it is established or maintained” by any employer or employee organization. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a).
“‘[E]mployee benefit plan’ or ‘plan’ means an employee welfare benefit plan or
an employee pension benefit plan.” Id. § 1002(3).
40. See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1338 (5th Cir.
1992) (holding that ERISA provides “no remedy, state or federal, for what may
have been a serious mistake”); see also WOOTEN, supra note 30, at 283–84 (noting
the limited remedies available to plan participants).
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2) (saving from ERISA preemption “any law of
any [s]tate which regulates insurance, banking, or securities”).
42. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (“We read the deemer
clause [of ERISA] to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state laws that ‘regulat[e] insurance’ within the meaning of the saving clause.”).
43. See WOOTEN, supra note 30, at 281.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 281–82.
46. See id. at 282.
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insurance, most employer-sponsored plans are regulated only by ERISA’s
sparse regime.47
Consumers can sue under ERISA for their benefits in federal court.48
But they must first exhaust the levels of appeal available within the plan.49
Most consumers never appeal once, much less the two times that ERISA
plans can require.50 Fewer than one percent of denied claims are appealed at all.51 Possible reasons are the confusing nature of the appeal
process, consumers’ multiple bills and claims, and the overwhelming nature of coping with underlying illness at the same time.52 Moreover, even
if a consumer goes on to sue and win, the consumer cannot receive an
award of attorney’s fees for this administrative phase of the process.53
When consumers reach federal court and sue for their benefits, the
available remedies are thin.54 ERISA generally permits only recovery of
the benefit’s value or the actual procedure, but not both.55 That is, if a
consumer is improperly denied a lung transplant and then successfully
sues in federal court to obtain it, the consumer still only receives the lung
transplant.56 The same is true even where the consumer has suffered
damages beyond the claim’s value.57 And, when administrators fail to fol47. See id.
48. ERISA allows plaintiffs to bring a case to “recover benefits due to [them]
under the terms of [the] plan, to enforce [their] rights under the terms of the
plan, or to clarify [their] rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2022).
49. See D’Amico v. CBS Corp., 297 F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 2002).
50. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(c)(2) (“The claims procedures of a group health
plan will be deemed to be reasonable only if . . . [they] do not contain any provision . . . that requires a claimant to file more than two appeals of an adverse benefit determination prior to bringing a civil action under section 502(a) of the Act.”).
51. Pollitz & McDermott, supra note 12 (explaining that the percentage of
claims denied varies widely across plans and consumers appealed less than one
percent of their denied claims).
52. See, e.g., KAREN POLLITZ, CYNTHIA COX, KEVIN LUCIA & KATIE KEITH, MEDICAL DEBT AMONG PEOPLE WITH HEALTH INSURANCE 29–30 (Henry J. Kaiser Family
Found. 2014) (explaining some of the reasons that consumers with denied claims
do not appeal, such as the overwhelming nature of illness and the confusing
process).
53. See, e.g., Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co. 368 F.3d 999, 1011
(8th Cir. 2004) (“We join the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits in holding
that term ‘any action’ . . . does not extend to pre-litigation administrative proceedings.” (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1))).
54. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004) (citing Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1986)); see also DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring) (noting that “virtually all state law remedies are preempted but very few federal substitutes are
provided”).
55. See, e.g., Martin v. Ark. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 299 F.3d 966, 972–73 (8th
Cir. 2002) (affirming judgment that awarded a lung transplant); Mass. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (allowing no consequential damages
for claims processing delays).
56. See, e.g., Martin, 299 F.3d at 972.
57. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 250, 255 (1993).
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low regulations governing claims processing, they are at worst told to go
back and try again.58 The consumer receives no compensation for the
protracted—often years-long—effort required to secure payment.
II.

COURTS DEVELOP

AN

ERISA ATTORNEY’S FEE TEST

Without the risk of consequential or punitive damages, administrators
who improperly delay or deny ERISA claims have one remaining concern:
attorney’s fees. The default in American litigation is that each party pays
its own attorney’s fees, unless a statutory exception applies.59 ERISA contains such an exception, granting judges discretion to award fees to either
side.60 The provision itself contains no guidance for the discretion, and
ERISA’s legislative history is also unhelpful in this regard.61 Soon after
ERISA’s enactment, however, courts fashioned their own guidance, requiring a fee claimant to achieve “some degree of success on the merits” and
satisfy a five-factor test.62 The attorney’s fee decision is reviewed for abuse
of discretion.63
A. “Some Degree of Success on the Merits”64
To receive an attorney’s fees award, a party must first achieve “some
success on the merits.”65 The exact degree of success is not completely
58. Most often, the administrator must only reprocess the claim using the
proper guidelines. See, e.g., Boyd v. Sysco Corp., No. 13599, 2015 WL 7737966, at
*14, *18 (D.S.C. Dec. 1, 2015) (noting that defendant United Behavioral Health
“failed to comply with the procedural requirements of ERISA [in regard to document disclosure]” but denying request for attorney’s fees and simply remanding
case to the administrator for another review); Lukas v. United Behav. Health, 504
F. App’x 628, 629–30 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that defendant failed to provide a
reason for the denial and did not disclose, upon request, file notes in its possession
that contained a more complete explanation of its decision).
59. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247
(1975).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (2022) (“In any action under this subchapter
[other than actions on behalf of the plan for employer contributions under 29
U.S.C. § 1145], the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and
costs of action to either party.”).
61. See Da-Wai Hu, Running the Caucus-Race: Prevailing Parties and Fee Shifting
Under ERISA, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 217, 220 (2000) (noting that “[l]egislative history
is . . . unhelpful in suggesting proper applications of fee shifting under ERISA”);
see also Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 59 F.3d 201, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(“Neither the statute nor the legislative history indicates whether or how that discretion should be guided.”); Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1303
(6th Cir. 1991) (stating that “no history exists to provide guidance to the courts”).
62. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 254 (2010) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983)).
63. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1); see, e.g., Mullins v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 642 F.2d
1302, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
64. Hardt, 560 U.S. at 256.
65. Id. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (showing no prevailing party requirement), with id. § 1132(g)(2) (imposing a prevailing party requirement). The degree of success can include varying results. See Taaffe v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
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clear, but the Supreme Court, in establishing this standard, characterized
the circumstances in that case—remand, a favorable view of the merits,
and an eventual award of benefits—as “far more” than those required for
a fee award. This implies that circumstances less favorable can also merit
such an award.66
Remand for reprocessing is a common outcome in ERISA claims
cases, and most courts now consider this sufficient success on the merits to
satisfy the first prong of the attorney’s fee analysis.67 A minority of courts
still hold that a remand, without more, is insufficient.68 Even when courts
conclude that a remand is enough of a success, a remand still will not
result in a fee award if the claimant cannot satisfy the five-factor test.69
B. The Five-Factor Test
The second prong of the attorney’s fee analysis is a five-factor test,
developed in the 1970s when courts addressed the first claims under the
recently enacted ERISA statute.70 These early cases concerned financial
769 F. Supp. 2d 530, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding success where a plan’s insurer
gave the plaintiff all she sought in her complaint); Rangel v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
No. 15-303, 2016 WL 1449539, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2016) (noting a voluntary
settlement shows some success); Carlson v. HSBC-N. Am. (US) Ret. Income Plan,
542 F. App’x 2, 7–8 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding some success where a defendant’s
change in how it credited a break in service led to the plaintiff obtaining most of
the relief she sought).
66. See Gross v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 763 F.3d 73, 76 (1st Cir.
2014).
67. See id. at 80 (holding that a remand for further consideration was sufficient success on the merits where the court had stated that the more deferential
standard of review should not apply); McKay v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.,
428 F. App’x 537, 54647 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming lower court’s decision that
remand was sufficient success on the merits because the plaintiff received “another
shot” at his claimed benefits through the remand for further consideration);
Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan—Nonbargained Program, 963 F. Supp. 2d
950, 961–62 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding that a remand is sufficient success on the
merits to satisfy that prong of the attorney’s fee analysis because remand is neither
a purely procedural victory nor a trivial success).
68. See, e.g., Vivas v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 10-22992, 2013 WL
5226720, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 17, 2013) (denying attorney’s fees request and
deeming outcome a “purely procedural victory” where plaintiff secured a review
on remand due to the defendant’s breach of a fiduciary duty); Dickens v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., No. 10-88, 2011 WL 1258854, at *6 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 28, 2011) (denying fee request after remand for further consideration).
69. For example, where a defendant did not comply with the ERISA claims
procedures and “failed to provide plaintiff a reasonable opportunity for a full and
fair review,” a court still did not award fees. Saint Joseph’s Hosp. v. Carl Klemm,
Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 824, 833–34 (W.D. Wis. 2006). The court explained that
there was no indication that the defendant was “simply out to harass” the plaintiff.
Id. at 834; see also Geiger v. Pfizer, Inc., 549 F. App’x 335, 338–39 (6th Cir. 2013)
(affirming a district court’s decision not to award attorney’s fees because although
the plaintiff had achieved “some degree of success on the merits” the defendant
was insufficiently culpable and its position had some merit).
70. See Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 464–65 (10th Cir. 1978) (setting out five
factors). The five factors are:
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malfeasance under ERISA—the test accordingly considers moral culpability and benefit to members of the plan.71 But the test is nonetheless
grounded in ERISA’s over-arching goals: to maintain plan participants’
benefits and to provide “ready access” to the federal courts.72 The five
factors remain virtually unchanged today.73
The case that first stated the five-factor test addressed the standards of
conduct of ERISA fiduciaries, specifically, a breach of fiduciary duties by
the trustee of an employee profit-sharing plan.74 The trustee carried out
financial transactions that enriched himself at plan participants’ expense,
thus breaching his fiduciary duties by failing to act in the sole interest of
plan participants.75
The court announced without explanation the five factors still used
today: (1) “the degree of the “offending [opposing] parties’ culpability or
bad faith,” (2) the opposing party’s ability to pay attorney’s fees, (3)
whether an award would have a future deterrent effect in similar circumstances, (4) whether the parties seeking an award benefitted all participants and beneficiaries of a plan or resolved a significant ERISA legal
question, and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions.76 “No single
factor is determinative,” and courts usually “consider each factor in exercising their discretion.”77
The factors are generally applied as follows, with some variation
across the circuits:
(1) The degree of the opposing party’s culpability or bad faith.
This factor usually requires more than simply denying a claim
(1) the degree of the offending parties’ culpability or bad faith; (2) the
degree of the ability of the offending parties to personally satisfy an award
of attorney’s fees; (3) whether or not an award of attorney’s fees against
the offending parties would deter other persons acting under similar circumstances; (4) the amount of benefit conferred on members of the pension plan as a whole; and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ position.
Id.
71. See id.
72. S. REP. NO. 93–127, at 4865 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4865.; see also Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Tr., 746 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1984)
(noting that a court applying its discretion should do so consistently with ERISA’s
purpose of protecting employee benefits and giving access to the federal courts);
Chambless v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 815 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir.
1987) (“ERISA’s attorney’s fees provisions must be liberally construed to protect
the statutory purpose of vindicating retirement rights, even when small amounts
are involved.”).
73. See, e.g., Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 249
(2010).
74. Eaves, 587 F.2d at 464–65.
75. Id. at 456.
76. Id.; see, e.g., Lawrence v. Westerhaus, 749 F.2d 494, 495–96 (8th Cir. 1984).
77. Moon v. Unum Provident Corp., 461 F.3d 639, 642–43 (6th Cir. 2006).
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incorrectly.78 Even if the claim denial is so incorrect as to be
deemed arbitrary and capricious, those actions may not satisfy
this factor.79 “Bad faith” can mean “arbitrary, reckless, indifferent, or intentional disregard of the interests of the person owed a
duty.”80 Defendants who litigate a novel theory in good faith will
not have this factor charged against them.81 While some courts
require actual ill will, others note the disjunctive nature of the
factor and consider the concepts of bad faith and culpability separately, finding that either one may satisfy this factor.82
(2) The opposing party’s ability to pay attorney’s fees. As to this
factor, interpretations vary. Some courts take notice of a defendant’s status as a household name or member of the Fortune 100
and infer that the defendant can satisfy an attorney’s fee award,
while others require evidence of ability to pay.83 Early ERISA
cases set out the rule that any fee award should be paid by the
offending party personally and that non-culpable, non-party plan
participants should not pay the fee.84
(3) Whether an award would have a future deterrent effect in
similar circumstances. Interpretation of this factor varies, with
some courts finding this factor satisfied if a plaintiff simply holds
a plan administrator to account by bringing a lawsuit, but with
78. Rangel v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 5:15-cv-00303-ODW, 2016 WL 1449539,
at *2 (C.D. Cal. April 12, 2016) (declining to assume bad faith simply due to a
claim denial).
79. See, e.g., Heffernan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 101 F. App’x 99, 109
(6th Cir. 2004) (“An arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits does not necessarily indicate culpability or bad faith.”).
80. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Jackson, No. 3:14-cv-41, 2018 WL
4489289, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2018) (quoting Benkert v. Med. Protective Co.,
842 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1988)).
81. See Alexandra H. v. Oxford Health Ins., Inc, 778 F. App’x 797, 800 (11th
Cir. 2019).
82. Tedesco v. I.B.E.W. Local 1249 Ins. Fund, 729 F. App’x 136, 139 (2d Cir.
2018).
83. Compare Priority Sols., Inc. v. Cigna & Price Waterhouse Health Plan, No.
98 CIV. 4336 MBM., 1999 WL 1057202, at *4 (Dec. 20, 1999) (holding that
CIGNA, as a major insurance company, was capable of paying attorney’s fees), with
Mendez v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 789 F. Supp. 139, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(holding that “TIAA–CREF clearly has the resources to pay Plaintiff’s attorney’s
fees.”).
84. See, e.g., Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 464 (10th Cir. 1978) (“By enacting a
statutory authorization for award of attorney’s fees, we believe Congress intended
that the offending party bear the costs of the award, rather than non-culpable,
non-party plan participants.”); Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629,
643–44 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (assessing fees against the individual defendants and noting that “[w]hile the private plaintiffs’ attorneys have gained a benefit for the Plan
as a whole, there is no reason why that benefit should be diminished by a deduction for fees and costs”).
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others requiring more.85 Some courts consider the deterrent effect on other plan administrators, not just on the defendant.86
The deterrent effect is usually regarded as strongest where the
defendant engages in deliberate misconduct, such as denying a
claim without any basis, rather than when the defendant is
merely mistaken.87 Deterrent effects have also included fostering appropriate behavior in defending and settling lawsuits.88
(4) Whether the parties seeking an award sought to benefit all
participants and beneficiaries of a plan or to resolve a significant
ERISA legal question. This factor generally requires that the
plaintiff do more than ask that the plaintiff’s own rightful benefits be paid.89 What more is required, however, is not always
clear. Some courts look to whether the victory had an actual effect that would benefit other plan participants, such as an increase in benefits.90 Others examine whether the plaintiff sought
rather than actually conferred such a benefit.91 Other considerations may include whether a plaintiff sought to resolve a key or
particularly complex legal issue.92
85. See, e.g., Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of America, 59 F.3d 201, 208–09
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that it was incorrect to hold that there was no deterrent
effect from a lawsuit that could create incentives for ERISA administrators to keep
better records of contacts with participants); Rodriguez v. MEBA Pension Tr., 956
F.2d 468, 472 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding a deterrent where a fiduciary made a mistake and then breached fiduciary duties); Nat’l Cos. Health Benefit Plan v. Saint
Joseph’s Hosp., 929 F.2d 1558, 1575 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that a deterrent effect can include encouraging appropriate behavior in litigating and settling cases).
86. See, e.g., Gaeth v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 538 F.3d 524, 531 (6th Cir. 2008)
(“This court has consistently interpreted the deterrence factor as requiring consideration of a fee award’s deterrent effect on other plan administrators.”).
87. See, e.g., Foltice v. Guardsman Prods., Inc., 98 F.3d 933, 937 (6th Cir.
1996) (“[F]ee awards are likely to have the greatest deterrent effect where deliberate misconduct is in the offing.”).
88. See Eddy, 59 F.3d at 208 (noting that ERISA is designed to protect benefits
for plan participants, and also to “deter[ ] unnecessary prolongation or unjust resolution of ERISA claims”).
89. See Rangel v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 5:15-cv-00303-ODW, 2016 WL
1449539, at *3 (C.D. Cal. April 12, 2016) (finding the factor unsatisfied where a
plaintiff simply wanted his benefits to be paid).
90. See, e.g., Chambless v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 815 F.2d 869,
872 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Those opinions looked not to plaintiff’s motive in bringing
suit, but to the effect of plaintiff’s victory. It is the latter that is controlling . . .
since the district court found that [plaintiff’s] suit had the effect of conferring a
common benefit, the fifth factor of the test was satisfied.”).
91. Rangel, 2016 WL 1449539, at *3 (noting that the inquiry should be into
whether the plaintiff sought to benefit all plan participants or not); Oster v. Barco
of Cal. Emps.’ Ret. Plan, 869 F.2d 1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 1988) (deciding that this
factor was not satisfied where plaintiff sought “benefit for himself, regardless of the
impact such a payment might have on the future beneficiaries of the Plan”).
92. See, e.g., Eddy, 59 F.3d at 206.
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Generally, if plaintiffs simply want their own benefits to be
paid, this factor will count against plaintiffs.93
(5) The relative merits of the parties’ positions.94 For this factor,
courts look to whether each party’s position had a basis, or
whether the position was unjustified or frivolous.95 This factor
weighs against a plaintiff’s fee award if the defendant took a wellreasoned position with some factual support or if the law was uncertain and the defendant’s position was justified on that basis.
The Seventh Circuit adds a “substantial justification” test to
the five factors—if a party’s position is “substantially justified,”
then attorney’s fees should not be assessed against it.96 The
court applying this test asks whether the losing party took its position in good faith and was substantially justified or whether it was
simply trying to harass its opponent.97
The application of these five factors often results in no fee award,
even where a plaintiff pursues a claim through multiple levels of internal
appeal and secures a reassessment of the denial.98
III.

AN INCREASINGLY HARSH CLAIMS ENVIRONMENT

Recalibration of the attorney’s fee factors is particularly urgent, as
consumers face cost containment measures and plan terms that make benefits more difficult to obtain. And, due to changes in the standard of review, plan administrators’ risk of facing consequences for their mistakes is
lower than ever.
A. The Rise of Cost Containment Measures
When ERISA was enacted in 1974, the focus was on risks to participants’ pensions from poor planning or mismanagement. Health plans
were not the source of concern, as they typically followed an indemnity
93. See Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of America, 844 F. Supp. 790, 794
(D.D.C. 1994) (“This factor does not weigh in favor of an award. The plaintiff did
not seek to benefit others in his claim.”).
94. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Westerhaus, 749 F.2d 494, 495–96 (8th Cir. 1984).
95. Id.
96. Kolbe & Kolbe Health & Welfare Benefit Plan v. Med. Coll. of Wis., Inc.,
657 F.3d 496, 506 (7th Cir. 2011).
97. See Raybourne v. Cigna Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 700 F.3d 1076, 1090 (7th Cir.
2012).
98. See, e.g., Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 1153, 1162
(10th Cir. 2007) (holding that while the administrator acted arbitrarily and capriciously, the attorney’s fee issue was not ripe until after remand); Quinn v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 161 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming a finding
that the benefits denial was arbitrary and capricious, but reversing the attorney’s
fee award because the denial was not “totally lacking in justification”); Saint Joseph’s Hosp. v. Carl Klemm, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 824, 834 (W.D. Wis. 2006).
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model, paying claims with little controversy and without questioning physician’s judgment.99
Yet as medical technologies advanced and complex therapies
emerged, healthcare spending grew rapidly.100 The plans’ approach of
retrospective payment, or simply paying for services provided, came to be
inconsistent with the growth in services and new technologies.101 And,
ERISA’s liability shield for claims administration mistakes opened the
door to cost-cutting tactics that blurred the lines between medical and insurance judgment.102 This growth in spending led to aggressive cost-cutting measures, including the use of narrower provider networks,
gatekeeping through primary care providers, and utilization review.103 By
2000, however, consumer and provider dissatisfaction led to less restrictive
cost containment measures.104
Then, after costs grew once again, health plans reintroduced utilization review methods that they had previously loosened.105 Plans also used
policies including requests for authorization after a consumer reaches a
certain threshold of use, such as a third MRI or a certain number of chiro99. WOOTEN, supra note 30, at 283 (“When Congress passed ERISA, health
plans generally operated on a traditional fee-for-service or indemnity-insurance
model . . . . The insurer would decide whether the claim was covered by the plan
and then reimburse or not reimburse accordingly.”); David D. Griner, Paying the
Piper: Third–Party Payor Liability for Medical Treatment Decisions, 25 GA. L. REV. 861,
862 (1991); see Van Vactor v. Blue Cross Ass’n, 365 N.E.2d 638, 645 (Ill. App. Ct.
1977) (holding that an insured was justified in relying on his physician’s judgment
that treatment was medically necessary and that the insurance company could not
deny the claim based on simple disagreement with that judgment); Mount Sinai
Hosp. v. Zorek, 271 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1016 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1966) (“Only the treating
physician can determine what the appropriate treatment should be . . . . [a]ny
other standard would involve intolerable second guessing”).
100. In the 1970s and 1980s, the cost of healthcare rose considerably in the
United States. See E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical
Care, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1719, 1720 (1987). “Per capita healthcare costs . . . trebled”
from 1950 to the 1980s, “rising from 5% to nearly 11% of the GNP between 1960
and 1983. By the end of 1987, health care spending was [approaching] half a
trillion dollars [or] 11.4% of the GNP.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
101. See id. at n.7 (citing Aaron & Schwartz, Hospital Cost Control: A Bitter Pill to
Swallow, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 1985, at 160–61 (1985)) (“[D]escribing development of health care ‘payment system designed to shield patients and providers
from the cost of hospital care’”).
102. See WOOTEN, supra note 30, at 283 (“[B]ecause adverse decisions under
utilization review often occur before treatment and may result in a patient not
receiving care, disputes about coverage take on a much more threatening cast.”).
103. See Glen P. Mays, Gary Claxton & Justin White, Managed Care Rebound?
Recent Changes in Health Plans’ Cost Containment Strategies, 23 HEALTH AFFS. W4-427,
W4-427 (2004), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.W4.427
[https://perma.cc/PS6F-V4UP].
104. See id. at W4-427, n.4.
105. Id. at W4-429 (“Health plans in six of the twelve study communities reintroduced prior authorization requirements for selected services after having eliminated these requirements.” (citation omitted)).
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practor visits.106 Other techniques included concurrent review, by which
a person’s hospital stay or other ongoing use is reviewed as it occurs.107
While these techniques had previously been used in Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs) rather than Preferred Provider Organizations
(PPOs), in the early 2000s, PPOs also started to monitor care this way.108
In addition, the early 2000s saw health plans increase their investments in
information systems that would make retrospective review and application
profiling more feasible.109 Today, utilization review serves as a significant
gatekeeper in accessing care.110
“Medical necessity” terms are a key part of cost containment; today,
practically all health plans contain such a term. In principle, the idea of
providing care based on medical necessity makes sense—care should not
be given or covered under a health plan unless there is some reason for
it.111 But the use of this term has gone beyond the idea of having a physician’s approval for a course of treatment. Instead, health plans are able to
define this term and interpret it themselves in order to restrict care, often
according to opaque standards and reasons.
The terms themselves contain multiple parts and are complex,112
106. Id. at W4-429–30.
107. Id. at W4-430.
108. Id.
109. Id. at W4-431.
110. See, e.g., Christopher Smith, It’s a Mistake: Insurer Cost Cutting, Insurer Liability, and the Lack of ERISA Preemption Within the Individual Exchanges, 62 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 75, 98–99 (2014).
111. Janet L. Dolgin, Unhealthy Determinations: Controlling “Medical Necessity”, 22
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 435, 436 (2015).
112. As an example, here is the definition of “medically necessary” from a
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas employer-sponsored plan in 2018:
Medically Necessary or Medical Necessity means those services or supplies
covered under the Plan which are: [1] Essential to, consistent with, and
provided for the diagnosis or the direct care and treatment of the condition, sickness, disease, injury, or bodily malfunction; and [2] Provided in
accordance with and are consistent with generally accepted standards of
medical practice in the United States; and [3] Not primarily for the convenience of the Participant, his Physician, Behavioral Health Practitioner,
the Hospital, or the Other Provider; and [4] The most economical supplies or levels of service that are appropriate for the safe and effective
treatment of the Participant. When applied to hospitalization, this further means that the Participant requires acute care as a bed patient due
to the nature of the services provided or the Participant’s condition, and
the Participant cannot receive safe or adequate care as an outpatient.
The medical staff of [the Claim Administrator] shall determine whether a
service or supply is Medically Necessary under the Plan and will consider
the views of the state and national medical communities, the guidelines
and practices of Medicare, Medicaid, or other government-financed programs, and peer reviewed literature. Although a Physician, Behavioral
Health Practitioner or Professional Other Provider may have prescribed
treatment, such treatment may not be Medically Necessary within this
definition.
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inviting non-objective considerations to play a role.113 Even clinically indicated care may be denied under a standard such as this.114 And, each
individual plan (if governed by federal law) or each state (for plans governed by state law) can adopt its own definition of “medical necessity,”
leading to even more confusion about what will and will not be covered.115 As a result, coverage determinations under this standard may
turn as much on the decision-maker’s motives as on the reasons for the
proposed care.116 Under the lenient arbitrary-and-capricious standard of
review, denials based on interpretation of the medical necessity term tend
to be affirmed.
All of these developments in claims processing occurred after the circuits adopted the five-factor fee test. Assessment of ERISA’s attorney’s fee
factors should take into account the far different claims landscape that
exists now as compared to the one that plaintiffs faced in the 1970s when
the factors first arose.
B. A Standard of Review that Favors Defendants
Another significant change since the five factors’ development is that
ERISA claims are now reviewed on a deferential arbitrary and capricious
standard of review. In 1989, the Supreme Court held that ERISA claims
should be decided on a de novo standard of review, to avoid giving ERISA
BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD OF TEX., YOUR HEALTH CARE BENEFITS PROGRAM 63–64
(2016), https://www.bcbstx.com/static/tx/pdf/policy-forms/mmh3.pdf [https://
perma.cc/43NP-8PAD].
113. See Dolgin, supra note 111, at 443 (“[M]edical necessity determinations
depend on the knowledge, politics, motives, and inclinations of those who render
them far more than they depend on objective truths.”).
114. Id. at 438–39 (“[V]arious stakeholders assume different interpretations
of the phrase . . . ‘To many health plans, [the term] means “not covered even
though not expressly excluded from coverage,” which gives them a degree of comfort issuing denials based on established insurance practice even though such decisions outrage physicians.’”) (quoting William M. Sage, Managed Care’s Crimea:
Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health
Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597, 601 (2003)).
115. See United States Psychiatric Rehabilitation Association, Comment Letter
to the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services regarding the Mental Health Parity & Addiction Equality Act of 2008 (May 26, 2009), https://www.dol.gov/sites/
dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/
1210-AB30/00250.pdf [https://perma.cc/J97V-R8TJ].
116. See Dolgin, supra note 111, at 443.
[A]t the level of medical necessity determination, whether coverage is
extended or denied in particular cases continues to depend on a slew of
factors including, most importantly, the name, position, and motives
(both express and implicit) of the decision-makers, as well as the shifting
economic and political choices of payers (by whom the decision–makers
are usually employed, either directly or indirectly).
Id.; see also Sage, supra note 114, at 601 (“[D]ecisions involving medical necessity
are frequently characterized by inconsistent administration, poor communication,
distrust and, if disputes arise, relatively unprincipled, results–oriented judicial
resolution.”).
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claimants fewer rights than they had before ERISA was enacted.117 The
Court noted that plans and participants were free to decide on a narrower
standard—and administrators promptly inserted a discretion-granting
clause into practically every ERISA plan.118 Discretionary clauses are
banned as unfair to consumers in twenty-five states,119 yet they are permitted in ERISA plans. States that ban discretionary clauses are from across
the political spectrum, including Texas,120 Utah,121 and California.122
Today, when an ERISA plan administrator’s claim denial is challenged in federal court, the discretionary clause triggers the lenient “arbitrary or capricious” standard of review.123 Under this standard, the plan
administrator’s decision is undisturbed if there is some evidence to support it. For healthcare consumers, this standard of review is difficult to
overcome, as it is the “least demanding form of judicial review . . . .”124
The standard is so deferential that a decision is said to remain in place
unless it was without basis or simply “whimsical.”125 One court stated that
it would be an overstatement—but not much of one—to say that a decision stays in place under this standard unless one cannot state it “without a

117. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
118. Id.
119. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners deems these
clauses “inequitable, deceptive, and misleading to consumers.” Brief for Nat’l
Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee at 16, Standard Ins.
Co. v. Morrison, 584 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-35246). Due to ERISA’s
preemption of state laws, these bans do not reach ERISA plans.
120. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.1203 (2010).
121. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-201(3) (West 2021).
122. CAL. INS. CODE §10110.6 (West 2012).
123. See, e.g., Corry v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 499 F.3d 389, 398 (5th Cir.
2007) (“[R]eview of the administrator’s decision need not be particularly complex
or technical; it need only assure that the administrator’s decision fall somewhere
on a continuum of reasonableness—even if on the low end.” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Vega v. Nat’l Life Ins. Serv., Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 297 (5th
Cir. 1999))).
124. Collins v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 682 F. App’x 381, 385 (6th Cir.
2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Schwalm v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of America, 626 F.3d 299, 308 (6th Cir. 2010)).
125. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals equated the arbitrary or capricious
standard to “totally unreasonable” in Allen v. United Mine Workers of America 1979
Benefit Plan & Trust, 726 F.2d 352, 354 (7th Cir. 1984), and to “whimsical, random,
or unreasoned” in Teskey v. M.P. Metal Prods., Inc., 795 F.2d 30, 32 (7th Cir. 1986).
See also Graham v. L & B Realty Advisors, Inc., No. Civ. A. 3:02CV0293-N, 2003 WL
22388392, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2003) (“Although there is clear evidence to
the contrary, the Court, with some reluctance, acknowledges some concrete evidence supporting Unum’s decision.”).
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loud guffaw[.]”126 This discretion thus amounts to free rein to assess
claims and often to deny them.127
Particularly in complex medical cases or claims for mental health
treatment, the lenient arbitrary and capricious standard can be outcomedeterminative in favor of the ERISA defendant. Under this standard, a
plan administrator can take a complex factual record and tie something in
the record to the decision, which is often all that is required to have the
denial affirmed.128
Thus, developments in the claims processing environment make denials easier to justify and mistakes less likely to be corrected. ERISA’s purpose remains, however, to protect plan participants’ right to benefits and
to provide ready access to the federal courts. If ERISA is to accomplish its
purpose, attorney’s fees must be available, as they are the only consequence for improper denials in an environment that increasingly disfavors
individual claimants.
IV.

RECALIBRATING TWO

OF THE

FIVE FACTORS

The Supreme Court made clear that the factors are not required and
bear no obvious relation to ERISA;129 other courts have long stated that
the factors are just guidelines, and courts are not bound to use them.130
Thus, a redesign and update of the factors is realistic and possible.
Two of the five attorney’s fee factors should be disregarded or applied
differently in the healthcare claim context if the factors are to serve ERISA’s mission of helping claimants secure their benefits and access the
126. Pokratz v. Jones Dairy Farm, 771 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Although it is an overstatement to say that a decision is not arbitrary or capricious
whenever a court can review the reasons stated for the decision without a loud
guffaw, it is not much of an overstatement. The arbitrary or capricious standard is
the least demanding form of judicial review . . . .”).
127. See, e.g., Johnson v. Allsteel, Inc., 259 F.3d 885, 890 (7th Cir. 2001)
(“[A]dministrators empowered . . . with discretionary authority to construe the
plan enjoy ‘a broad, unchanneled discretion to deny claims.’” (quoting
Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327, 333 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also Foster
McGaw Hosp. of Loyola Univ. v. Bldg. Material Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers
Welfare Fund, Local 786, 925 F.2d 1023, 1026 (7th Cir.1991) (“[W]ith the [administrator’s] decision entitled to deference, the outcome is foredoomed.”).
128. Foster v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 920 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 2019)
(describing an arbitrary decision as one that is “made without a rational connection between the known facts and the decision or between the found facts and the
evidence.”); Holland v. Int’l Paper Co. Ret. Plan, 576 F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 2009)
(noting that a plan’s decision is an abuse of discretion if it is not based on some
evidence, even if disputed, that supports the denial).
129. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 255 (2010).
130. See, e.g., Iron Workers Local No. 272 v. Bowen, 624 F.2d 1255, 1266 (5th
Cir. 1980) (setting out the five factors and noting that “some [factors] may not be
apropos in a given case”); Williams v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 609 F.3d 622, 635 (4th
Cir. 2010) (describing the factors as “general guidelines” to be applied).
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federal courts.131 Individual healthcare claimants can rarely satisfy these
two factors, namely the bad faith or culpability factor and the intended or
actual common benefit factor. As explained below, including these factors
as part of the test for individual healthcare claimants undercuts ERISA’s
goals. Moreover, the healthcare claims climate today features challenges
that did not exist when the five factors arose more than forty years ago; the
factors should change accordingly.
A. The Bad Faith or Culpability Factor
The bad faith or culpability factor is often understood as requiring
proof of a dishonest mental state. With limited discovery, individual
healthcare plaintiffs can rarely establish a dishonest mental state, especially when payors simply deny claims without a valid reason. The factor is
applied inconsistently, with some courts reciting the factor as “bad faith or
culpability” and then focusing exclusively on the “bad faith” prong of this
disjunctive test.132 “Bad faith” in this context tends to be interpreted as
“dishonesty of belief or purpose.”133 Some require evidence of the defendant’s ill intent, such as a defendant being “simply out to harass” the plaintiff.134 Courts tend not to find bad faith for an unjustified claim denial,
even when the denial is arbitrary and capricious, meaning the denial has
little or no foundation in the factual record.135 While this factor often
seems to take on an outsized importance in the five-factor test, denial of

131. “It is well established that ‘Congress intended the fee provisions of ERISA to encourage beneficiaries to enforce their statutory rights.’” Donachie v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 745 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Slupinski v. First
Unum Life Ins. Co., 554 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 2009)); see Locher v. Unum Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 389 F.3d 288, 298 (2d Cir. 2004) (“ERISA’s attorney’s fee provisions
must be liberally construed to protect the statutory purpose of vindicating retirement rights . . . .” (quoting Chambless v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 815
F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1987))).
132. See, e.g., Lampert v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 03 Civ. 5655 (GEL), 2004
WL 1395040, at *1–*2 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2004) (listing the factor as “culpability or
bad faith” but then referring to the factor as “bad faith” in the analysis).
133. Denver Health & Hosp. Auth. v. Beverage Distribs. Co., No. 11-cv-01407LTB-KLM, 2012 WL 5354700, at *4 (D. Colo. Oct. 30, 2012) (quoting United
States v. Lain, 640 F.3d 1134, 1137 (10th Cir. 2011)).
134. Pactiv Corp. v. Sanchez, No. 13-cv-8182, 2015 WL 4508667, at *8 (N.D.
Ill. July 23, 2015) (holding that the bad faith or culpability factor was not satisfied
where “there [was] no indication that [the defendant] took the position that it did
in this litigation in bad faith or to harass [the plaintiff]”); Saint Joseph’s Hosp. v.
Carl Klemm, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 824, 834 (W.D. Wis. 2006) (denying motion for
attorney’s fees because the defendant was not “simply out to harass” plan
participant).
135. See, e.g., Voltz v. Chrysler Group LLC—UAW Pension Plan, 63 F. Supp.
3d 770, 785 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (noting that an arbitrary or capricious denial does
not necessarily indicate bad faith).
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attorney’s fee based on the absence of bad faith alone may be considered
error.136
Other courts, however, find the factor satisfied with less, often by focusing on the factor’s culpability prong. Courts have found this factor
satisfied where a defendant took an unjustified position and then persisted
in that position until litigation137 or where the defendant violated the
plain meaning of a plan.138 Others find culpability based on the summary
rejection of medical evaluations that supported the opposing view.139
Courts differ on whether this factor is satisfied when a defendant acts arbitrarily and capriciously.140
This factor would be better tailored to individual healthcare claims if
courts would take to heart its disjunctive nature—bad faith or culpability—
and consider it satisfied when defendants act culpably by failing to follow
claims regulations, ignoring evidence that supports the plaintiff’s claim, or
otherwise breaching their fiduciary duties to plan participants. This is because, as explained more fully below: (1) ERISA plaintiffs generally cannot
pursue discovery to root out bad faith, which may occur at higher corporate levels than the claims level, (2) the test is disjunctive, such that culpability equally satisfies the factor, and (3) non-payment, not motivation, is
the point of individual healthcare claims. In individual healthcare claims,
then, this factor should be disregarded or should be satisfied when a defendant acts culpably by denying a valid claim or ignoring evidence that
supports paying the claim.
1. No Discovery into the Administrator’s Motivations
Plaintiffs in ERISA cases are usually denied discovery into the defendant’s motivations and mental processes—the very evidence needed to satisfy this factor—unless they can make a prima facie showing of misconduct
136. See, e.g., Donachie, 745 F.3d at 47 (reversing denial of attorney’s fees that
was based on the absence of bad faith and noting that “a party need not prove that
the offending party acted in bad faith” in order to receive a fee award).
137. See, e.g., Lampert, 2004 WL 1395040, at *2 (finding this factor satisfied
where defendant took an unjustified position, was unresponsive to pre-litigation
settlement, but then “capitulated immediately” upon initiation of litigation).
138. See Priority Sols., Inc. v. Cigna & Price Waterhouse Health Plan, No. 98
CIV. 4336 MBM, 1999 WL 1057202, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1999) (holding that
the factor was satisfied when CIGNA violated the plain meaning of a plan’s terms).
139. See, e.g., Slupinski v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 554 F.3d 38, 53 (2d Cir.
2009); Voltz, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 785 (finding culpability but not bad faith where a
plan administrator ignored a company doctor’s claim that a person had a mental
health condition).
140. Compare Heffernan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 101 F. App’x 99, 109
(6th Cir. 2004) (“An arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits does not necessarily indicate culpability or bad faith.”), with Moon v. Unum Provident Corp., 461
F.3d 639, 644 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that defendant’s arbitrary and capricious
actions satisfied the bad faith or culpability factor).
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or bias.141 Plaintiffs can seek some limited information as to whether the
defendant complied with ERISA’s procedural requirements and whether
the defendant has provided coverage in similar situations.142 The plaintiff
generally cannot, however, pursue discovery much beyond the plaintiff’s
own file.143 This limited review of benefit decisions is due to concerns of
cost and expediency, as well as the broad discretion granted to administrators.144 In some instances, plaintiffs are granted discovery on issues going
beyond the claims decision.145 These may include the completeness of
the administrative record, whether the plan administrator has a conflict of
interest and the extent of any such conflict, which arises from the administrator’s dual role of simultaneously making benefits determinations and
funding the plan.146
Bad faith may be difficult to root out when it occurs at higher corporate levels than would be found in the claims file, as the recent class action
case Wit v. United Behavioral Health147 shows. In that case, United Behavioral Health used its own, stricter internal guidelines to decide claims
rather than the standards advertised in the plans and even those required
by law.148 Through extensive discovery, the court found that the administrators put profits ahead of their fiduciary duties, “prioritizing cost savings
141. See, e.g., Crosby v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 647 F.3d 258, 262 (5th
Cir. 2011). Where the claim is one for benefits, evidence is not generally admissible unless it: (1) is in the administrative record, (2) is connected to the administrator’s past interpretations of the plan, or (3) would help the court understand
medical terms and procedures. Id.; see also Semien v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am.,
436 F.3d 805, 814–15 (7th Cir. 2006) (denying discovery because “the plan administrator’s motivations should not be questioned absent a prima facie showing of
some misconduct or conflict of interest” and referring to instances in which additional discovery is allowed as “exceptional cases”).
142. See Crosby, 647 F.3d at 263–64.
143. Under ERISA, claims for plan benefits under section 1132(a)(1)(B) are
often limited to the review of the administrative record; courts are concerned that
additional discovery “would frustrate ERISA’s goal of ‘provid[ing] a method for
workers and beneficiaries to resolve disputes over benefits inexpensively and expeditiously.’” Colaco v. Asic Advantage Simplified Pension Plan, Inc., 301 F.R.D. 431,
434 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Players Ret.
Plan, 410 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2005)).
144. See Mulligan v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 584, 587
(E.D. Tenn. 2011) (“This general prohibition [on discovery] is founded on two
separate principles: First, the reviewing court’s role, ordinarily, is . . . merely to
determine whether the administrator’s decision was defensible . . . [and to] effectuate[ ] ERISA’s ‘primary’ goal—the ‘inexpensive[ ] and expeditious[ ]’ resolution of disputes.” (quoting Perry v. Simplicity Eng’g, 900 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir.
1990))); Semien, 436 F.3d at 814.
145. Crosby, 647 F.3d at 263.
146. Id.
147. No. 14-cv-02346-JCS, 2020 WL 6479273, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2020),
rev’d, No. 20-17363, 2022 WL 850647 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 2022).
148. The Wit case included claims based on multiple plans against an administrator of those plans; some of the plans were fully insured, and others were
funded by employers. Wit, No. 14-cv-02346-JCS, 2019 WL 1033730, at *14.
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over members’ [recovery of benefits].”149 Even when state standards required the use of particular definitions of medical necessity, the claims
administrator ignored that definition and substituted its own more restrictive definition.150 In this way, the claims administrator violated the laws of
Illinois, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Texas.151 Even beyond its claims
practices, United Behavioral Health then lied to regulators and tried to
mislead the court at trial.152 These actions would probably not be found in
individual claim files—usually ERISA plaintiffs’ only source of evidence—
as the decisions to create stringent internal standards were made at much
higher corporate levels. To expect induvial plaintiffs to demonstrate this
sort of bad faith without access to discovery is to set plaintiffs up for failure
on this factor.
2. Culpability Should Satisfy This Disjunctive Test
For individual healthcare claims, courts should focus on the second
part of this disjunctive fee factor—the “culpability” part. “Culpable” conduct is generally less blameworthy than bad faith and does not include
malice, implying rather that the “act or conduct spoken of is reprehensible or wrong, but not that it involves malice or a guilty purpose.”153 If
conduct breaches a legal duty or commits a fault, it is culpable conduct.154
Application of this concept of “culpability” to ERISA defendants
should take into account that ERISA defendants are held to a high standard of behavior because any ERISA decision-maker is a fiduciary.155 The
fiduciary duty includes a duty of care and a duty of loyalty.156 Indeed,
ERISA’s duty of loyalty “ ‘is the highest known to the law.’ ERISA fiduciaries must ‘discharge [their] duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.”’157 ERISA decision-makers are
149. Id. at *5.
150. Id. at *42–45.
151. Id. at *42.
152. Supra note 148.
153. McPherson v. Emps.’ Pension Plan of Am. Re-Insurance Co., 33 F.3d
253, 256–57 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).
154. See id.
155. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2022) (defining a fiduciary as one who exercises discretionary authority or control over the plan and its management, administration, or disposition of assets).
156. ERISA charges fiduciaries with: (1) a duty of care to discharge duties
prudently and in accordance with the Plan, and (2) a duty of loyalty to act “solely
in the interest of the” beneficiaries. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). The duty of care
requires fiduciaries to act “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent [person] acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims.” Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B). The duty of loyalty requires a
fiduciary to discharge its duties “for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits
to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of
administering the plan.” Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
157. Singh v. RadioShack Corp., 882 F.3d 137, 149 (5th Cir. 2018). These
duties help ensure that consumers receive their benefits. See Brundle v. Wilming-
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under a fiduciary duty to provide benefits to those who are entitled to
them.158
Because ERISA decision-makers are subject to these duties, the “culpability” factor should be considered satisfied whenever a defendant
breaches its standard of care (imposed by ERISA’s fiduciary duties) by ignoring evidence supporting a claim, by failing to follow claims regulations,
or by improperly delaying payment.159 Some courts do exactly this.160
For these courts, culpability is established when a defendant makes a benefit determination “unsupported by competent medical evidence.”161 This
factor may also be met when a denial is arbitrary and capricious.162
Furthermore, to require actual dishonesty for this factor is to hold
ERISA fiduciaries to a less stringent standard of behavior than the standard for commercial insurers who are under no fiduciary duty. That is,
ton Tr., N.A., 919 F.3d 763, 770 (4th Cir. 2019) (“These duties ‘ensure that employees will not be left empty–handed once employers have guaranteed them
certain benefits.’” (quoting Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996))).
158. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). “ERISA imposes higher-than-marketplace quality
standards” on plan administrators, requiring them to “‘discharge [their] duties . . .
solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries’ of the plan.” Metro.
Life Ins. Co. v. Glen, 554 U.S.105, 115 (2008) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)). A
fiduciary “must consider the interests of deserving beneficiaries as it would its
own.” Joseph F. v. Sinclair Servs. Co., 158 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1253 (D. Utah 2016)
(quoting Gaither v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 394 F.3d 792, 807–08 (10th Cir. 2004)).
159. See, e.g., Donachie v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 745 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir.
2014) (noting that the “concepts of ‘bad faith’ and ‘culpability’ are distinct, and
either one may satisfy the first [ ] factor”). The Donachie court noted that the defendant had acted culpably by ignoring evidence that favored the claimant. Id.
160. See Moon v. Unum Provident Corp., 461 F.3d 639, 643–44 (6th Cir. 2006)
(per curium) (finding the bad faith or culpability factor met when defendant repeatedly ignored substantial evidence supporting the plaintiff’s claim); Hoover v.
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 801, 809–10 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding
culpability where defendant relied only on a physician it employed and disregarded evidence supporting the plaintiff’s claim); Tedesco v. I.B.E.W. Local 1249
Ins. Fund, 729 F. App’x 136, 139 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that a defendant’s reliance on two psychiatrists who did not consult with the treating psychiatrist could
satisfy the culpability factor); Perrin v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 06-182-JBC, 2008
WL 2705451, *3 (E.D. Ky. July 7, 2008) (“Based on the defendant’s disregard for
objective medical evidence, the court finds that the defendant was highly culpable,
and thus, this factor weighs in favor of an award of attorney’s fees.”); Brooking v.
Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 04-95KSF, 2007 WL 781333, *7 (E.D. Ky.
Mar. 12, 2007) (noting that a defendant ignoring substantial evidence in the record should be found culpable); Plummer v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. C-3-06094, 2007 WL 838926, *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 15, 2007) (finding defendant highly
culpable, in part because the defendant terminated benefits based on flawed medical opinions).
161. See, e.g., Gaeth v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 538 F.3d 524, 530–531 (6th Cir.
2008) (finding the bad faith or culpability factor satisfied where the defendant acts
culpably by denying a claim without competent medical evidence to support the
denial).
162. See Priority Sols., Inc. v. Cigna & Price Waterhouse Health Plan, No. 98
CIV. 4336 MBM, 1999 WL 1057202, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1999) (holding that a
party who is arbitrary and capricious is culpable for purposes of this factor).
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commercial non-ERISA insurers have long been held to act in bad faith or
otherwise subject to penalties when they denied claims without investigation,163 when they delayed or denied payment after receiving sufficient
proof of loss,164 or when they refused to pay an insured’s covered claim
without “proper cause.”165 Thus, to search in every ERISA case for a defendant who is “out to get” or to “harass” a plaintiff is to set individual
ERISA plaintiffs up to fail on this factor.
3. To Require Bad Faith Is to Miss the Claim’s Point
When an administrator does not pay a covered claim, the consumer
suffers from a lack of healthcare or from financial harm due to paying for
care that should have been covered. The issue here is one of the payor
retaining money that should go to the consumer, not financial malfeasance per se, as was the case with the early attorney’s fee cases in which this
factor originated.166 ERISA’s goal is to protect consumers’ right to benefits, and its attorney’s fee provision should be interpreted the same way—
to require bad faith before the attorney’s fee provision can function is to
burden the provision with concerns not expressed in ERISA.
If courts ignore the culpability prong of this factor and look for bad
faith alone, as bad faith is traditionally understood, then individual plaintiffs with denied claims are unlikely to satisfy this factor.167 For the most
part, these are sophisticated corporate defendants who are unlikely to memorialize a desire to “harass” a healthcare claimant, as some courts have
required.168
Thus, due to lack of discovery, the operation of bad faith at higher
levels, and questionable relevance of bad faith to this kind of claim, to
require bad faith to satisfy this factor is to set the bar unreasonably high
for individual plaintiffs to meet in an ordinary ERISA health claims case.
A focus on culpable conduct instead—taking into account the high stan163. See, e.g., Kilmer v. Conn. Indem. Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 237, 248–49 (M.D.
Pa. 2002) (holding that a jury could find the defendant acted in bad faith where it
delayed a claim and investigated in an unreasonable manner).
164. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 892 S.W.2d 519, 523
(Ark. Ct. App. 1995).
165. Pemberton v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 858 P.2d 380, 382 (Nev. 1993) (noting
that an insurance company acts in bad faith when it fails to pay an insured’s covered claim and that this is a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
166. See, e.g., supra note 71.
167. See, e.g., Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 59 F.3d 201, 210 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (analyzing the first factor as “bad faith” only and finding that a court could
reasonably conclude that even a defendant’s “inexplicable omission” was not evidence of bad faith); Clark v. Feder, Semo & Bard, P.C., 59 F. Supp. 3d 114, 118
(D.D.C. 2014) (citing the “bad faith or culpability” factor but then focusing exclusively on bad faith).
168. See, e.g., Quinn v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 161 F.3d 472, 478 (7th
Cir. 1998) (stating that the question is whether the administrator’s decision is justified and taken in good faith or whether the administrator was out to “harass” the
claimant).
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dards that ERISA imposes on decision-makers’ behavior—is more appropriate for this factor.
B. The Common Benefit Factor
Courts have taken different approaches to analyzing the common
benefit factor—some have considered how it originated,169 and others
have recited it and then ignored it.170 This reaction is understandable, as
the factor is a poor fit for individual benefit claims: (1) this factor has no
basis in ERISA itself or in attorney’s fee principles, so it creates a burden
on plaintiffs’ access to federal courts that conflicts with ERISA, (2) the
equitable concerns in common fund cases are absent here, (3) application
of this factor encourages plaintiffs to pursue broader and more complex
claims than they otherwise would, which is antithetical to ERISA’s goal of
prompt claims resolution.
1. No Basis in ERISA
This fee factor implies that in seeking their own benefits due, ERISA
plaintiffs should also litigate on behalf of other plan participants; but ERISA does not impose or even mention such a duty. And, this factor
originated in equitable concerns surrounding common fund cases, where
fees were paid from a pool of money obtained in the lawsuit, concerns
absent from individual healthcare claims. Because this factor unfairly burdens plaintiffs’ claims for benefits, it should be recalibrated as described
further below.
ERISA protects individuals’ right to benefits—it does not impose a
duty toward other plan participants. ERISA aims to secure benefits, to
provide ready access to the federal courts, and to provide a uniform set of
laws and regulations for the administration of employee benefits.171 To
accomplish this, ERISA provides for “appropriate remedies, sanctions, and
ready access to the Federal courts.”172
ERISA imposes strict fiduciary duties on plan administrators and
other decision-makers, not on beneficiaries.173 ERISA fiduciaries are
169. See, e.g., Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1304 (6th Cir.
1991) (“This appears to be a codification of the common fund doctrine of the
common law . . . we might give the fourth King-Eaves factor a broader meaning.”).
170. See, e.g., Raymond M. v. Beacon Health Options, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 3d
1250, 1287 (D. Utah 2020) (setting out all five factors but analyzing only four,
leaving out the common benefit factor).
171. Congress meant to “protect . . . the interests of participants in employee
benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2022). The congressional findings and declaration of policy explain the importance of ensuring
that pensions are sufficiently funded and that “disclosure be made and safeguards
be provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and administration of
such plans . . . .” Id. § 1001(a).
172. Id. § 1001(b).
173. ERISA imposes a fiduciary duty on anyone who “exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of [the] plan or dis-
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under a duty of loyalty, which requires that the fiduciary “shall discharge
[their] duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries . . . .”174 Nowhere in ERISA does the law impose a
duty by a plan participant or claim plaintiff toward other plan participants.
ERISA fiduciaries are prohibited from acting in a self-serving manner,
while ERISA’s provisions protect participants’ rights and create a path to
federal court for the participants to secure their own benefits. Why, then,
should a duty from one beneficiary to the others appear nowhere else, but
as a factor in an attorney’s fee award? The answer may lie in the kind of
case in which this factor first appeared, discussed below.175
2. No Basis in Fee-Shifting Principles
This factor originated in common fund cases, where equitable concerns prompted courts to spread the attorney’s fee burden across the
group of people who benefitted from the case; that concern is absent from
individual healthcare claims. The factor first appeared as part of the ERISA fees test in Eaves v. Penn,176 an early ERISA case involving a pension
fund, a breach of fiduciary duties resulting in personal enrichment, and
the subsequent return of money to the fund.177 The judgment in that
case resulted in a fund that benefitted all plan participants, and the lower
court used the common fund approach instead of an ERISA-specific approach to award fees from the fund.178 The court of appeals questioned
whether the common fund approach was correct and announced instead
the factors the lower court should have considered in applying ERISA’s
attorney’s fee provision—those were the same factors applied today.179
The court of appeals held that the ERISA attorney’s fee provision is not
simply a codification of the common fund principle, but is a new doctrine
permitting a fee award from the defendant personally.180 The court reaffirmed that any award of fees should come from the wrongdoer, rather
cretionary control respecting management of [the] plan or exercises any authority
or control respecting management or disposition of its assets.” 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1002(21)(A)(i), (iii).
174. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
175. See, e.g., Jessica Michelle Westbrook, Resolving the Dispute Over When Attorney’s Fees Should Be Awarded Under ERISA in Two Words: Plaintiff Prevails, 53 ALA. L.
REV. 1311, 1318 (2002) (noting that this factor resembles the common fund principle by which courts can award fees from a common fund that benefits non-litigating parties).
176. 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978).
177. Id. at 464–65.
178. See id. at 464 (noting that the plaintiffs recovered assets on behalf of the
Plan and analyzing whether attorney’s fees in that case should be paid by the common fund or from the defendants personally).
179. Id. at 465.
180. See id. at 464–65 (“[Section 1132(g) is] a specific statutory authorization
of attorney’s fees [that] will, in most cases, eliminate the necessity which gave rise
to the common fund exception to the American rule.”).
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than from non-party, non-culpable plan participants.181 Other appellate
courts followed suit in cases addressing similar financial issues that set out
to benefit all plan members.182
In those early common fund and pension benefit ERISA cases, equitable principles militated in favor of fees being paid from the common fund
award—otherwise, plan participants who had not litigated yet who benefitted from the litigation’s result would be unjustly enriched if they did not
also share in its cost.183 A fee award from the recovery avoided a windfall
to those who had risked nothing in the litigation.184 Thus, courts shifted a
share of the fees onto the non-litigating beneficiaries’ recovery.185 The
doctrine of common fund fee recovery is different from that of fee-shifting
statutes such as ERISA’s; under common fund fee recovery, the beneficiaries of the litigation pay the fees.186 A fee-shifting statute, on the other
hand, has the losing party pay the prevailing party’s fees.187 This is true of
ERISA’s fee-shifting provision too.188 If the fees are to be paid by the plan
and the plan would not be able to pay other claims, then that concern
would be addressed in another attorney’s fee factor—the second factor
181. See id. at 464 (“Congress intended that the offending party bear the
costs of the award, rather than non-culpable, non-party plan participants.”).
182. Without analysis, the Ninth Circuit adopted the five factors in a case involving a forfeiture clause in a profit–sharing plan. Hummel v. S.E. Rykoff & Co.,
634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980). The same happened in the Second Circuit,
when the court decided a pension case in which a plaintiff sued for the removal of
a plan amendment that disfavored the workers and was held to violate ERISA.
Chambless v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 815 F.2d 869, 870–71, 873 (2d
Cir. 1987).
183. See, e.g., Tiana S. Mykkeltvedt, Common Benefit & Class Actions: Eliminating
Artificial Barriers to Attorney Fee Awards, 36 GA. L. REV. 1149, 1150–51 (2002) (noting
that attorney’s fee awards in common fund cases were meant to spread the cost of
litigation across the benefitting group).
184. “[P]ersons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to its
cost are unjustly enriched at the successful litigants’ expense.” Boeing Co. v. Van
Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 472, 478 (1980); see Gay v. Davis, 12 S.E. 194, 194–95 (N.C.
1890) (“In the absence of statutory provision, the courts, in the exercise of chancery powers, [can] make allowances [of] . . . reasonable compensation to counsel
. . . .”).
185. See, e.g., Brundle v. Wilmington Tr., 919 F.3d 763, 785 (4th Cir. 2019).
186. See id.
187. See id. at 786 (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421
U.S. 240, 247 (1975); James C. v. Aetna Health & Life Ins. Co., 499 F. Supp. 3d
1105, 1124–25 (D. Utah 2020) (noting that any attorney’s fee award would be paid
by defendant Aetna, whose ability to pay “is not seriously in question”); James F. ex
rel. C.F. v. Cigna Behav. Health Inc., No. 1:09CV70DAK, 2011 WL 2441900, at *2
(D. Utah June 15, 2011) (noting that fees would be paid by Cigna, who is “certainly
in a position to pay any award of attorney fees”).
188. While the provision’s text permits recovery to either party, case law requires that to recover attorney’s fees, an ERISA litigant must achieve “some degree
of success on the merits.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242,
255 (2010) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983)).
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explicitly addresses the “offending party’s ability to satisfy personally an
award of attorney’s fees.”189
The equitable principle of unjust enrichment underlying the common fund fee analysis is absent from the ERISA individual health claim
context. ERISA plaintiffs already receive bare-bones recoveries, if any, as
consequential and punitive damages are unavailable.190 As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out, the concerns are different when the
plaintiff does not receive a “pool of money” from which fees can be
paid.191 Furthermore, ERISA is meant to provide ready access to the federal courts—nowhere is that aim tempered by a requirement that ERISA
claimants also seek to benefit all other plan members.
Moreover, unlike the common fund and pension cases that gave rise
to this factor, in an ERISA healthcare claim, the lawsuit’s express goal is
simply to obtain the benefit for the plaintiff. This factor penalizes plaintiffs for bringing claims expressly provided in ERISA and would reduce the
plaintiff’s recovery (by forcing plaintiffs to pay their own attorney’s fees)
for arbitrary circumstances generally beyond plaintiffs’ control. That is, to
the extent the factor asks whether the case resolves a particularly important or complex legal issue, that is not generally the plaintiffs’ focus in
trying to obtain their rightful benefits, nor does the ERISA statute condition a plaintiff’s right to benefits on the difficulty of the legal issues. And,
if there are insufficient plan participants situated similarly to the plaintiff
who would also benefit from the litigation, it would be wrong to penalize
the plaintiff just because the defendant has not harmed enough other
people for the litigation to be of broader benefit.192
As most courts interpret this factor, an individual healthcare claimant
could almost never satisfy it. That is, when a factor requires that a plaintiff
“[sought] to obtain a common benefit for all of the participants in [the]
plan and . . . that other participants in the plan were similarly situated[,]”193 individual plaintiffs will not succeed. An individual healthcare
claimant seeking that a benefit be properly paid cannot satisfy this factor
because that is not what the claim entails, and even if an individual wanted
to seek out similarly situated plan members, ERISA’s limits on discovery194
generally will not permit individual plaintiffs to find them.

189. Davidson v. Canteen Corp., 957 F.2d 1404, 1409 (7th Cir. 1992).
190. See infra Part II.
191. Martin v. Ark. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 299 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir. 2002).
192. Lampert v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 03-Civ. 5655, 2004 WL 1395040, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2004) (“[A]s plaintiff correctly points out, he should not be
penalized simply because the defendant’s actions did not harm enough individuals
for the suit to benefit anyone but himself.”).
193. Bustetter v. CEVA Logistics U.S., Inc., No. 18-58-DLB-EBA, 2019 WL
6719485, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 10, 2019) (first alteration in original).
194. See supra Section III.A.1.
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3. Rewarding a Multiplicity of Claims and Theories
In individual claims cases, this factor undercuts the expediency goals
of ERISA because it rewards plaintiffs who expand their claims and theories.195 That is, some courts analyzing this factor look for indications that
the plaintiff sought to include other plan participants in the litigation or
to resolve unsettled legal issues. A factor that incentivizes the expansion
of claims litigation is a poor fit for individual ERISA claim litigation and
should not be used in individual claims cases.
Courts are of course free to recite the common benefit factor and
discount or ignore it in their discretion, and some have done just that.196
An alternative approach is to find this factor satisfied when the plaintiff
brings suit, thereby holding the defendant accountable for following plan
terms and proper procedures. As explained above,197 plan administrators
for the most part act without consequence.198 By navigating through the
complex appeal process and suing in federal court, individual plaintiffs
hold ERISA administrators accountable in a manner that rarely happens
and that occurs only with great personal effort.199 Courts subscribing to
this point of view note that the fee factors used in health benefit cases
originated in pension cases, where a prevailing party’s fees “may be
awarded at the direct expense of other plan beneficiaries.”200 In health
claim cases, on the other hand, there is a benefit to other plan members in
simply bringing suit and ensuring the administrators answer for their actions, particularly given that the plaintiff’s remedies are so limited.
V.

ATTORNEY’S FEES

MUST BE

AVAILABLE
INTENDED

FOR

ERISA

TO

FUNCTION

AS

The attorney’s fee provision is part of a carefully designed set of ERISA duties and incentives that function together to protect benefits and
195. See Sec’y of Dep’t of Labor v. King, 775 F.2d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 1985)
(stating that the resolution of a significant legal issue under ERISA would satisfy
this factor).
196. See, e.g., Raymond M. v. Beacon Health Options, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 3d
1250, 1287 (D. Utah 2020) (setting out the traditional five factors but not explicitly
analyzing the common benefit factor in granting plaintiff’s fee request).
197. See supra Part I.
198. See, e.g., Schoedinger v. United Healthcare of the Midwest, Inc., No. 4:04cv-664 SNL, 2006 WL 3803935, at *8 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 6, 2006) (“United continuously processed claims improperly, long after it was made aware of its mistakes.
Despite countless requests by Plaintiffs, Defendant refused to remedy its errors, at
times owing up to $600,000 in past due fees.”).
199. Plaintiffs must navigate the two levels of appeal without any chance of
recovering attorney’s fees for that phase of the litigation.
200. Pitcher v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 870 F. Supp. 2d 903, 916 (S.D.
Ind. 1994). The Pitcher court noted that the factor analyzing the benefit to other
plan participants is “focused on pension plans” and found it satisfied when the
plaintiff brought suit to enforce the plan. Id. at 917 (“While her suit could conceivably result in higher premiums in the long run (or perhaps in a modification
of the policy), adherence to the policy should benefit other insureds.”).
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provide ready access to the federal courts.201 The factors are not required, and courts should take a more flexible approach to the factors so
the provision can accomplish its goal.
A.

The Five Factors Tamper with the Attorney’s Fee Provision

By imposing a burden on individual health claimants that they can
rarely meet, the five factors alter ERISA’s fee provision by making fees
unavailable to many individual plaintiffs. ERISA’s enforcement scheme
was drafted carefully, and courts are discouraged from adding to or subtracting from it.202 The Supreme Court has expressed reluctance to tamper with ERISA’s provisions—declining, for example, to find remedies
where they are not included in the text.203 As currently applied, however,
the five attorney’s fee factors similarly meddle with ERISA’s provisions by
burdening the protective attorney’s fee provision with considerations that
are nowhere in ERISA’s text and that ill suit individual claims. Because
individual ERISA plaintiffs can rarely access the federal courts without
money to pay an attorney, ERISA’s fee-shifting provision must be functional if the statute is to be effective.
The absence of other remedies makes the fee provision the only disincentive (other than reputational concerns) for defendants to deny claims
without basis, so that provision is particularly crucial.204 The current system of cost-free do-overs for non-compliance and deferential review gives
little incentive for administrators to comply with the claims regulations.205
201. Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002)
(noting that “ERISA is a ‘comprehensive and reticulated statute,’ the product of a
decade of congressional study of the Nation’s private employee benefit system.”
(quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993))).
202. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993) (stating that
ERISA’s “carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme provides ‘strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly’” (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.
134, 146–47 (1985))).
203. Id.
204. Schoedinger v. United Healthcare, No. 4:04-cv-664 SNL, 2006 WL
3803935, at *8 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 6, 2006) (awarding attorney’s fees). The Schoedinger
court noted:
[W]hether it be purposeful or negligent, insurance companies regularly
reduce and deny claims without cause, thereby increasing the cost of
healthcare to providers and patients alike. If it became cost prohibitive
for insurance companies to engage in this behavior, it would incentivize
more accurate claims administration and processing in the future.
Id.
205. See, e.g., Gatlin v. Nat’l Healthcare Corp., 16 F. App’x 283, 290 (6th Cir.
2001) (“[A] stiffer penalty encourages plan administrators to alter their behavior
with respect to employee appeals . . . .”); Perrin v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 06182-JBC, 2008 WL 2705451, at *4 (E.D. Ky. July 7, 2008) (“[T]he defendant will
take a closer look at the administrative record and its denial decisions if it is faced
with more than the prospect of merely reinstating benefits.”); Elliott v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., No. 04-174-DLB, 2007 WL 1558519, at *3 (E.D. Ky. May 29, 2007) (“Companies would likely take a much closer look at denial decisions, and the presenta-
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ERISA aims to provide “ready access” to the federal courts.206 Without some chance of recovering attorney’s fees, however, individual plaintiffs are unlikely to recover their benefits as ERISA intends, as the high
cost of litigation is one of the major obstacles to individuals’ access to the
courts.207 ERISA plaintiffs face particular challenges, as they must administratively appeal their denial at least once and often twice before bringing
suit—they generally cannot recover for attorney’s fees for this required
exhaustion of administrative appeals.208
While the specter of an avalanche of lawsuits is frequently offered to
rebut any change in favor of ERISA claimants, the actual proportion of
claimants who take even the first steps toward suing is small. Only a slight
percentage of plan participants with a denied claim appeal the denial.209
Even if attorney’s fees were made more available to plaintiffs, claims administrators still have multiple opportunities to correct innocent errors or
oversights—generally two administrative appeals and, since the Affordable
Care Act’s passage, external review of denials by an independent entity.
Thus, defendants have many opportunities to avoid the risk of paying attorney’s fees. And, as some courts have observed, a plan or insurance
company will be more inclined to take care when denying or terminating

tion of that decision, if forced to take into account the possibility that fees will be
awarded . . . .”); Powell v. Premier Mfg. Support Servs., Inc., No. Civ. A. 1-05-0012,
2006 WL 1529470, at *10 (M.D. Tenn. June 1, 2006) (“A fee award serves as a
deterrent to conclusory statements that are devoid of specific and fact-supported
reasons for denial of benefits.”).
206. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001(b).
207. Westbrook, supra note 176, at 1311 (noting that litigation expenses are
one of the major obstacles to access to courts for those of limited means).
208. Cann v. Carpenters’ Pension Tr. Fund for N. Cal., 989 F.2d 313, 316 (9th
Cir. 1993) (examining ERISA’s “in any action” language and concluding that it
refers to an action in court and not to pre-litigation administrative proceedings);
Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 1011 (8th Cir. 2004)
(joining “the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits in holding that the term
‘any action’ . . . does not extend to pre-litigation administrative proceedings.”
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1)). Some pre-litigation work may be included
within the “any action” umbrella, however. See, e.g., Dishman v. Unum Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 269 F.3d 974, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2001) (awarding fees for investigative work
prior to filing); Trs. of E. States Health & Welfare Fund v. Crystal Art Corp., No. 00
Civ. 0887 (NRB), 2004 WL 1118245, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2004); Pennsylvania v.
Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 561 (1986).
209. Between You and Your Doctor: The Private Health Insurance Bureaucracy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy, 111th Cong. 46 (2009) (statement of Patricia Farrell, Senior Vice President, Aetna Inc.) (“[I]n 2008 only a small percentage
of claims generated an appeal or a complaint.”); see, e.g., Caroline E. Mayer, The
Claim Game: Here’s How to Fight Back When Your Insurance Company Denies a Claim,
AARP MAG. (Nov. 2009), https://www.aarp.org/health/medicare-insurance/info09-2009/health_claim_game.html [https://perma.cc/9XHJ-FC4K] (citing Connecticut’s healthcare advocate Kevin Lembo as stating that ninety-six percent of
denials are not appealed).
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benefits if an improper denial or termination is likely to result in more
than a perfunctory request to reprocess the claim.210
B. The Factors Should Be Updated Post-Hardt
Overall, the five factors have resulted in erratic and inconsistent fee
awards that fail to advance ERISA’s goals.211 Courts are free to tailor the
factors to the particular cases before them, as the five factors are not required.212 Even when circuit caselaw extends maximum flexibility, district
courts are reluctant to question whether a particular factor makes sense in
any particular case. For the fees provision to be available to individual
plaintiffs, however, courts should do so.
The Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.213 Court requires claimants
to show “some degree of success on the merits,” but noted that the five
factors “bear no obvious relation” to ERISA’s text or the Court’s fee-shifting jurisprudence and “are not required for channeling a court’s discretion when awarding fees under this section.”214 Courts may award fees to
a party obtaining some success on the merits without any additional inquiry, the Court explained, or a court may use the factors to make its decision.215 Several courts of appeals have further emphasized that the factors
are considerations rather than a checklist and that there is flexibility in
their application.216
Despite the Court’s holding on the five factors, no circuit court of
appeals has yet abandoned the test. Various post-Hardt approaches, however, have emerged in the courts of appeals. Some hold that courts must
still use the five factors to guide their discretion to award fees in ERISA
cases.217 Other courts of appeals and district courts have held that the
210. See, e.g., Gatlin, 16 F. App’x at 290 (“[A] stiffer penalty encourages plan
administrators to alter their behavior with respect to employee appeals . . . .”);
Powell, 2006 WL 1529470, at *10 (“A fee award serves as a deterrent to conclusory
statements that are devoid of specific and fact-supported reasons for denial of benefits.”); Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 59 F.3d 206, 211–13 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Becker
v. Weinberg Group, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 9, 18 (predicting that if defendants knew
culpable conduct would result in attorney’s fee awards, they would be deterred
from such actions).
211. See Westbrook, supra note 176, at 1316 (noting the “erratic and conflicting fee award[s]” that have resulted from the five factors and the factors’ failure to
advance ERISA’s goals).
212. See Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 254–55
(1983).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 244, 254.
215. Id.; see also Donachie v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 745 F.3d 41, 46 (2d
Cir. 2014) (noting that success on the merits is the only required component of
the attorney’s fee test and that courts need not apply the five factors).
216. See, e.g., Martin v. Ark. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 299 F.3d 966, 972 (8th
Cir. 2002) (noting that the five factors are non-exclusive and are not to be mechanically applied and that to do so could undermine ERISA’s purpose).
217. See Temme v. Bemis Co., 762 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that
no circuit court of appeals has rejected the five-factor test post-Hardt); Raybourne
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threshold “some degree of success on the merits” test is the only part of
the ERISA fees test that the court must apply and that the five factors are
optional or flexible.218 Post-Hardt, the five factors are not mandatory in
the Second Circuit,219 and a denial of fees based on the five factors alone
is error.220 But while courts in the Second Circuit have discretion not to
apply the factors at all, they cannot cherry pick factors; they must at least
consider all of them, if they consider any.221
Even in circuits that expressly provide for maximum flexibility in applying or ignoring the factors, the five factors’ pull remains strong. In the
Fourth Circuit, the factors are considered guidelines, yet courts still tend
to apply all five without questioning whether a particular factor makes

v. Cigna Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 700 F.3d 1076, 1090 (7th Cir. 2012); Nat’l Sec. Sys.,
Inc. v. Iola, 700 F.3d 65, 103–04 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he court must consider the
[five] policy factors in determining whether to award fees and costs . . . .”); Treasurer, Trs. of Drury Indust., Inc., v. Goding, 692 F.3d 888, 898–99 (8th Cir. 2012);
Cross v. Quality Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 491 F. App’x 53, 55 (11th Cir. 2012); Williams v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 609 F.3d 622, 635 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[C]ourt[s] should continue to apply the general guidelines that we identified . . . .”); Simonia v. Glendale
Nisson/Infiniti Disability Plan, 608 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[D]istrict
courts must still consider the [five] factors before exercising their discretion to
award fees . . . .”); Thies v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 839 F. Supp. 2d 886, 891 (W.D.
Ky. 2012) (requiring the factors); Ortiz v. A.N.P., Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 896, 906
(S.D. Tex. 2011) (noting that several courts of appeal and district courts have held
that courts should continue to apply the five factors post-Hardt); Toussaint v. J.J.
Weiser, Inc., 648 F.3d 108, 110 (2d Cir. 2011); O’Callaghan v. SPX Corp., 442 F.
App’x 180, 186 (6th Cir. 2011) (deciding that Hardt did not change the five-factor
test); Lincoln Fin. Co. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 428 F. App’x 394, 396 (5th Cir.
2011). The five factors are still applied as originally written in the Sixth Circuit,
despite the Supreme Court’s signal of flexibility in Hardt. Voltz v. Chrysler Group
LLC, 63 F. Supp. 3d 770, 785 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (noting that “a five-factor test [is
used] in assessing whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in
awarding fees” and citing to a pre-Hardt case); Bustetter v. CEVA Logistics U.S.,
Inc., No. 18-58-DLB-EBA, 2019 WL 6719485, at *7–8 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 10, 2019) (noting that the five factors are mandatory and declining to award fees where a defendant acted negligently in not providing plan documents as required).
218. See Williams, 609 F.3d at 635 (noting that the factors are “guidelines” for
courts to apply).
219. See Toussaint, 648 F.3d at 110–11 (noting that courts “may [still] apply . . .
the [five] factors in ‘channeling [their] discretion when awarding fees’ under
§ 1132(g)(1)” (quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 255
(1983))); Donachie, 745 F.3d at 46 (holding that “whether a plaintiff has obtained
some degree of success on the merits is the sole factor that a court must consider in
exercising its discretion.”); Easter v. Cayuga Med. Ctr. at Ithaca Prepaid Health
Plan, 5:14-CV-1403 (BKS/TWD), 2017 WL 3267922, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. July 31, 2017)
(finding no need to consider the five factors in the case before the court).
220. Levitian v. Sun Life & Health Ins. Co., 486 F. App’x 136, 141 (2d Cir.
2012) (holding that “a denial of attorney’s fees after ‘[c]onsidering [solely] . . . the
[five] factors’ constitutes an error of law” (quoting Levitian v. Sun Life & Health Ins.
Co., No. 09 CIV. 2965 GBD, 2011 WL 565330, at *6, n. 6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2011))).
221. Donachie, 745 F.3d at 47 (noting that courts “cannot selectively consider
some factors while ignoring others”).
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sense in that context.222 Individual plaintiffs in this circuit are often taken
as not satisfying the common benefit factor, simply because their claims
are individual in nature,223 even though circuit caselaw points out that
certain factors “may not be apropos in a given case.”224 To include the
common benefit factor and find it lacking in individual cases, though, is to
penalize the kind of cases that ERISA intended plan members to bring.
Similarly, courts in the Second Circuit may opt not to use the factors and
focus just on the plaintiff’s success on the merits, but several courts have
chosen to apply the factors nonetheless.225 In awarding fees in individual
cases despite the lack of any “common benefit” as that is traditionally understood, several courts have recited this factor among the five and just
stated that it is not essential.226
The appellate courts are divided on whether ERISA’s attorney’s provision results a slight presumption in favor of prevailing plaintiffs receiving a
fee award227 or not.228 Either way, though, no court holds that the presumption should be against a fee award, which is the effect when the test
involves a five-factor test and two of the factors are so hard for individual
plaintiffs to satisfy.
CONCLUSION
To give ERISA’s attorney’s fee provision its proper effect, courts
should be more willing to question particular factors’ utility and effect in
the cases before them. It is undisputed that Congress intended ERISA to
222. See, e.g., Feldman’s Med. Ctr. Pharmacy, Inc., v. CareFirst, Inc., 898 F.
Supp. 2d 883, 910 (D.C. Md. 2012) (applying the traditional five factors in a case
between a pharmacy and a payor and finding that the common benefit factor was
not satisfied and no fees should be awarded).
223. See, e.g., Vincent v. Lucent Techs., Inc., No. 3:07-cv-00240, 2011 WL
5075650, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 25, 2011) (“[T]he Court finds this to be a case
largely of a personal nature rather than one in which Plaintiff ‘sought to benefit all
participants or beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA itself.’” (quoting Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co., 987 F.2d 1017,
1029 (4th Cir. 1993))).
224. Quesinberry, 987 F.2d at 1029.
225. In the Second Circuit, courts applying the factors have awarded fees by
finding the bad faith or culpability factor satisfied in the case of an arbitrary or
capricious denial. Valentine v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 14-CV-1752, 2016 WL
4544036, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2016). And the common factor either unnecessary or satisfied when a case’s outcome might encourage other administrators to
follow correct procedures. Id. at *6; Dwinnell v. Fed. Express Long Term Disability
Plan, No. 3:14-cv-01439, 2017 WL 1371254, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 14, 2017).
226. See, e.g., Valentine, 2016 WL 4544036 at *5–6.
227. See, e.g., Reinking v. Phila. Am. Life Ins., 910 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.
1990) (noting that “a prevailing individual beneficiary ‘should ordinarily recover
attorney’s fees unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust’”
(quoting Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1984))).
228. See, e.g., Williams v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 609 F.2d 622, 635 (4th Cir.
2010) (“We note at the outset that even a successful party . . . does not enjoy a
presumption in favor of an attorneys’ fee award.”).
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“encourage beneficiaries to enforce their statutory rights” and that the
provision should be “liberally construed” to protect beneficiaries’
rights.229 Courts should thus be willing to reject or recast fees factors that
do not fit the circumstances before them.
Hardt has made clear that the five factors are not required and are not
even related to ERISA—courts should accept this invitation to tailor the
five factors to cases before them so this sole incentive for plan administrators to process claims correctly the first time can function as intended.
229. See, e.g., Slupinski v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 554 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir.
2009) (“Congress intended the fee provisions of ERISA to encourage beneficiaries
to enforce their statutory rights.”); Locher v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 389 F.2d
288, 298 (2d Cir. 2004) (“ERISA’s attorney’s fee provisions must be liberally construed to protect the statutory purpose of vindicating retirement rights . . . .” (quoting Chambless v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 815 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir.
1987))).
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